

FORMOSA

BETRAYED

*George H. Kerr*

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Electronic version prepared by Leslie Ling-Chin Ruo  
E-mail: [taiwanpg@formosa.org](mailto:taiwanpg@formosa.org)  
<http://members.xoom.com/taiwan228/>  
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FOR MY FORMOSAN FRIENDS ...

*remembering the March Affair, 1947.*

### *The Heart of the Matter*

*"Our experience in Formosa is most enlightening. The Administration of the former Governor Chen Yi has alienated the people from the Central Government. Many were forced to feel that conditions under autocratic rule [Japan's rule] were preferable.*

*The Central Government lost a fine opportunity to indicate to the Chinese people and to the world at large its capability to provide honest and efficient administration. They cannot attribute their failure to the activities of the Communists or of dissident elements. The people anticipated sincerely and enthusiastically deliverance from the Japanese yoke. However, Chen Yi and his henchmen ruthlessly, corruptly, and avariciously imposed their regime upon a happy and amenable population. The Army conducted themselves as conquerors. Secret police operated freely to intimidate and to facilitate exploitation by Central Government officials. . . .*

*The island is extremely productive in coal, rice, sugar, cement, fruits and tea. Both hydro and thermal power are abundant. The Japanese had efficiently electrified even remote areas and also established excellent railroad lines and highways. Eighty per cent of the people can read and write, the exact antithesis of conditions prevailing in the mainland of China.*

*There were indications that Formosans would be receptive toward United States guardianship and United Nations trusteeship. They fear that the Central Government contemplates bleeding their island to support the tottering and corrupt Nanking machine, and I think their fears well founded."*

*Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer to the Secretary of State, August 17, 1947. (United States Relations With China, p. 309.)*

## PREFACE TO THE NEW EDITION

The Taiwan Publishing Co. has chosen a most appropriate time in the history of Formosa to make this book, *Formosa Betrayed*, widely available to those concerned about the future of that beautiful and embroiled island. An appropriate time indeed, when in Formosa a native Formosan has been installed as President. This unprecedented political development may signify for Formosans the beginning of a new era, where their long-held dream of liberation from their long-reigning oppressors may be realized through democratization and further social, cultural and economic evolution.

In the process of rebuilding a new democratic Formosa, serious effort should be made to redress the damage and injustice done to the land and people of Formosa for the last 43 years. It is essential to re-examine the various forces which brought about the Formosan's capitulation to an all powerful dictatorial government. Since the beginning of the Chinese occupation of Formosa in October, 1945, the ruling party has consistently maintained a policy of dis-crimination against the native Formosans while rooting out their sense of identity through the prohibition of public use of their native language and teaching of Formosan history and culture, all under the policy of

glorifying China and Chinese culture to the exclusion of Formosa and its culture, which were deemed to be but an insignificant part of the greater Chinese panorama. The numerous political slogans used by the KMT Government to bolster the morale of Chiang's followers since 1949 until today, ranging from "Fight against Communist Bandits," "Reconquest of the Mainland," "Unification of China under the Three People's Principles" to "One China, Two Governments," etc. are all double-edged, with one edge explicitly or implicitly directed at the native Formosans in order to ensure their continued submission to dictatorial rule.

George Kerr, largely through his insightful observation of the tragedy of the February 28 Incident, 1947 and its aftermath, clearly identified the forces at work which led to the subjugation of Formosa. His careful, accurate and balanced reports went to Nanking and thence to Washington. The truth revealed in those reports, the truth about the KMT's policy and activities in Formosa, shocked those in government who saw the reports. It is regrettable that, because of the propaganda counterattack launched by the China Lobby in the United States, his reports did not gain wider public exposure. It was only in 1965 that George Kerr managed to publish *Formosa Betrayed* which drew much of its content from those first hand reports of his observation and encounter in Formosa during and after the Incident of February 28, 1947.

The content of this volume has given the reader a great deal to learn, think and reflect upon even 27 years after its publication and 45 years after the February 28 Incident. George Kerr's insights in the true nature of Formosa's post-war history were born of his long association with Formosa. I had known him since his first visit to Formosa before World War II when he had taught English at the Taihoku-Kotogakko, where I was then a student although

unfortunately I did not study with him. In his second visit to Taipei as Vice-Consul of the American Consulate from 1945 to 47, I saw him again and heard a great deal about him from my father, Lin Bo-seng, who frequently met with him.

I recall vividly my emotional reunion with George Kerr in Honolulu some 19 years after he had left Taipei, with no opportunity for leavetaking, shortly after the February 28 Incident. He came to see me at the East-West Center where I was co-chairing with Dr. William Cardill at a conference on Mental Health Research in Asia and the Pacific. He presented me with a copy of the recently published *Formosa Betrayed* and embraced me while saying "Tsung-yi... I often thought of your father and your family while writing this book..." "I hope that this book of mine will help the Formosans liberate themselves and democratize the country, you people deserve better." His love for Formosa and Formosans greatly moved me and made me respect all the more this friend of Formosa. His words of you people deserve better," serve as the best commentary on the content of this book, while pointing out the long struggle ahead in achieving the goal of democratization and self-determination. The historical reality of General Wedemeyer's report as quoted in this volume is perhaps more keenly felt now that change has begun to stir on Formosa: "Chen Yi and his henchmen ruthlessly, corruptly and avariciously imposed their regime upon a happy and amenable population. The Army conducted themselves as conquerors. Secret police operated freely to intimidate and to facilitate exploitation by Central (KMT) Government officials."

Unfortunately, Formosans have suffered the same posture and highhanded horror tactics of the KMT rulers who have subjugated the Formosans as subordinates for close to 40 years, 37 years of them under martial law until 1987.

The devastating impact of such political oppression on the Formosan citizens has now become clear to many concerned with the future of Formosa, as the ill effects have come to affect all aspects of human life including education, the economy, industrial and technological development, social security and national identity.

There seem to be two major obstacles to democratization of Formosa: one is the still fragile political strength of the ruled Formosans who tend to value temporary safety or seeking immediate material gain for survival over long-term political struggle which often requires certain sacrifice, and the other is the tenacious adherence to the old feudal-emperor concept of the ruling party conservatives.

In this connection I am reminded of the brief note I put down on my diary after seeing the movie "The Last Emperor." The note simply says, "A good and interesting movie, but a wrong title." By a wrong title I meant that Pu-yi was not the last Emperor of China; there have been many since, although some of them did not have the official title of Emperor. One would include among them, Yuan Si-kai, Chiang Kai-shek, Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. Each of them certainly behaved as emperor and wanted others to so treat him. The tradition of authoritarianism of the ruler is still deeply engrained in the minds of both the rulers and the ruled in Chinese culture. A forceful example of this can be found as recently as June 4, 1989 at Tienanmen Square. For the rulers, only glory and power count. Human rights, freedom or equality or respect for the lives of people have to surrender to the might of the rulers.

In the face of similar timeworn attitude and beliefs it will require an enormous courage and persistent organized effort on the part of the enlightened public to keep democracy moving ahead in Formosa. Though still at an early

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stage, the Formosans have begun to show increasingly stronger interest in participating in the political struggle for self-determination, i.e. to be responsible for managing their own political affairs. They are giving even clearer expressions of aversion to being treated as second class citizens and being excluded from any effective voice in the political system. The hope for democratic political maturation in Formosa appears brighter now than in the past.

There is another extremely important international perspective bearing upon the republication of *Formosa Betrayed*. The world today is being swept by the storm of "democratization" as dictatorial regimes have been toppled throughout the world--foremost as seen in the East European countries and in the USSR. Knowledge of its own all too tragic past may help to open the tide of democratization in Formosa as well. I have every confidence that a democratic Formosa will play a greater role in East Asia as an example for the region and for the world. I sincerely welcome the second edition of George Kerr's decisive and important work.

**Tsung-yi Lin, M.D., F.R.C.P.C,  
Professor Emeritas of Psychiatry, University of  
British Columbia, Vancouver, B. C. Canada  
Honorary President, World Federation for Mental Health.**

## Foreword

IN MANY RESPECTS, Formosa is a living symbol of the great American dilemma. Put in simple and straightforward terms, that dilemma is how to fulfill the awesome responsibilities of being a global power, entrusted with the defense of many societies, and at the same time, remain faithful to the principles that constitute our political-ethical creed. There is no easy answer to this riddle. Indeed, no complete answer is possible, and we should beware of those who peddle simple solutions to enormously complex problems. This does not provide an excuse, however, for ignoring the most crucial challenge confronting American society in our times. Indeed, our success our very survival - may well depend upon finding more adequate answers than have been discovered to date.

Some eleven million people live on the island of Formosa, approximately nine million of them "native Formosans" who were born on the island and consider it their homeland. The older Formosans grew up under Japanese rule, a fact that has had an impact upon many aspects of their culture. Even the younger Formosans, however, tend to think of themselves as possessed of traditions, values, and a way of life distinct from that of the mainland Chinese. The emergence of a Formosan nationalism is thus a natural development, and despite the

many fissures existing in Formosan political circles, that movement strikes a responsive chord, especially among the intellectuals.

Those who believe that economic determinism is the key to all political phenomena will not find Formosa a case study to their liking. In its natural resources, particularly in the fertility of its soil Formosa has been amply blessed. The Japanese legacy and the more recent American largess, moreover, have combined to give the people of Formosa a much higher standard of living than that of most of their Asian neighbors. In enterprise as well as in agriculture, the native Formosan has played an active, dynamic role. Refugees from the mainland, until recent times at least were overwhelmingly engaged in government work, military service, and teaching. While not without its economic problems, Formosa is among that small number of non-western societies for which an optimistic economic prognosis is reasonable, particularly if the issue of population can be tackled in a serious fashion.

The problems of Formosa are overwhelmingly political. How long can the Formosans be excluded from any effective voice in their government in a system that purports to be constitutional and democratic? How long can the myth be continued that Formosa is China? How long can the estrangement between Formosan intellectuals and mainland refugees continue without serious political repercussions? Let no one underestimate the degree to which the Communists are seeking to take advantage of the political situation on Formosa. As might be expected, they are playing both ends against the middle. To the Nationalists, they urge a return to the motherland, with all past sins being forgiven. To the Formosans, they promise the rights of "cultural autonomy" and freedom from "the American-Chiang Kai-shek clique." Presumably, they hope that few Formosans know the true Communist record in Tibet and Sinkiang.

Meanwhile the Kuomintang continues to imprison Formosan

nationalists and dominate the political life of this island. But as the Nationalist leaders grow older and less certain of the future, political tension slowly mounts. Cleavages within Kuomintang circles are sharp and significant. Some mainland refugees would be prepared to accept and even welcome a truly democratic order. Others would prefer to depend primarily upon the secret police and the army. The situation is pregnant with political hazards--and possibilities. Where should we stand?

Few if any Americans are better equipped to present new perspectives on the Formosa problem than George H. Kerr. For some three decades, he has had both a scholarly and a personal interest in the Formosan people. At various critical periods, he has lived and worked with them, witnessing their few triumphs and their many tragedies. No one who reads this book will be unaware of the fact that the author has a deep sympathy with the cause of Formosan independence. No doubt many of his facts and arguments will be challenged by those who support different solutions. It will be impossible to ignore Kerr's case, however; he has marshalled evidence too well to permit that. I find myself in great sympathy with his basic theme. Self-determination for the Formosan people is one of those causes which happily unites our values and our national interests. But in any case, this work should stimulate some serious thinking about American policy toward Formosa both by those who agree and those who disagree with the author's conclusions.

ROBERT A. SCALAPINO

University of California, Berkeley  
April 1965

# Acknowledgments

MY NARRATIVE HERE is based upon thirty years of involvement with Formosan affairs. It began with a period of study in Japan (1935-1937), led on to a three-year residence at Taipei (1937-1940) and to graduate work at Columbia University.

As a so-called "Formosa Specialist" my civilian service with the War Department (1942-1943), commissioned service with the Navy (1944-1946) and again civilian service with the Department of State (1946-1947) gave me opportunities to see Formosa from the Washington or official point of view.

Since 1947 I have been concerned with the Formosa problem in a rather academic way. My lectures at the University of California (Berkeley) and at Stanford University may have been the first attempts to examine Formosa's historic role on the Western Pacific frontier.

In presenting this account I quote extensively from government sources, from the daily press at Taipei, Tokyo and Shanghai, and from personal letters. I am particularly indebted to members of the UNRRA team who were struggling to bring order out of Chinese chaos at Taipei during my service in the American Consulate there.

I have used official UNRRA reports and many private communications from team members. Some prefer to remain

anonymous and some have given me permission to quote directly from their reports, publications and letters. I am grateful to them all and to other members of the foreign community who contributed information incorporated here.

Correspondents still living on Formosa or having family and property there must remain unnamed.

Quotations from Formosan letters which were written originally in English have sometimes required slight editing to make the meaning clear without changing the substance. The changes are indicated with bracketing. Since most of the correspondents were at one time my students I assume responsibility in editing the texts.

Quotations from Formosan and Shanghai papers are taken from daily press summaries prepared at the American Consulate at Taipei. Files are presently on deposit at the Hoover Institute and Library at Stanford University.

The island is known to the Chinese and Japanese as *Taiwan*. I have retained this in direct quotations and in the names of most institutions, agencies and publications of which it is a part. Elsewhere I have used *Formosa*, from the old Portuguese name *Ilha Formosa* or "Beautiful Island."

Dr. K. C. Wu, former Governor of Formosa, has generously permitted me to quote extensively from his open letters to Chiang Kai-shek and to the National Assembly at Taipei. Dr. Ira D. Hirschy, UNRRA's Chief Medical Officer at Taipei in 1946-1947, has allowed me to use his private letters and his published observations. Peggy and Tillman Durdin arranged for me to read portions of an unpublished manuscript entitled *Taiwan and the Nationalist Government* which they are preparing for the Council on Foreign Relations at New York.

Edward Eckerdt Paine, Reports Officer for the UNRRA Office at Taipei and former Major in the United States Air Force in China, collaborated with me in 1948, at considerable personal sacrifice, in assembling raw materials for this record of conditions and events in Formosa in 1946 and 1947. I thank him here again for his cooperation.

Martha and Robert Catto, my colleagues in the Consulate, shared most of the "official experience" and much of the private adventure at Taipei, and have been good enough to read the present text in manuscript.

Dr. Robert A. Scalapino, who honors me with a Foreword here, is Chairman of the Department of Political Science at the University of California (Berkeley) and author of many significant commentaries on the Formosa Question.

Juanita Vitousek, at whose country place this was first drafted in 1958, has read and re-read the manuscript, making many useful comments. Alice Crabbe has done much of the typing, and George Sasaki has prepared the maps. I am grateful to them.

No one quoted in this record may be held responsible for the context into which I have introduced the materials, or for the interpretations which I have given them.

GEORGE H. KERR  
Honolulu, Hawaii  
February 28, 1965

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# Introduction

## *A Frontier Tradition*

FROM AN AMERICAN point of view on December 6, 1941, Formosa was a mere island-dot on the Western Pacific rim, lost against the vast backdrop of continental Asia. December 7 brought the rude awakening; the Japanese attack upon the Philippines was mounted from Formosan airfields and soon Japanese forces were pouring through and past Formosa into the Indies and Southeast Asia. Formosa had resumed its traditional role as a trouble spot in Asian waters.

It has been many times an international trouble spot because it lies in a maritime world, but always under the shadow of the continent nearby. Here two frontiers meet and overlap. In the days before air power the situation was well defined by the wide channel lying between the continent and the island much wider, it should be noticed, than the channel which isolates Britain from the continent of Europe. But from a contemporary continental point of view Formosa represents the easternmost thrust of a vast complex of continental interests, of Chinese interests pressing out toward the maritime world. From an oceanic point of view the island represents the westernmost point on the Western Pacific rim, a maritime frontier which embraces Japan, the Ryukyus and the Philippines, a world of seaborne trade and international politics.

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A seesaw conflict between this island world and the continent has been in evidence for at least two thousand years. The earliest Chinese notices of Formosa indicate that it was sparsely settled by fierce non-Chinese barbarians long before the Chinese themselves pushed southward from their homeland in the Yellow River basin to settle along the Fukien coast. These savages of a southern origin crossed the channel from time to time to plunder coastal villages or to seek a barter trade. The Chinese in turn sent out expeditions to punish them or to explore the distant island shores. In time a small settlement of Chinese fishermen appeared in the Pescadores but there were no significant attempts to displace the Formosan aborigines or to found permanent Chinese settlements on Formosa until the way had been prepared by others.

Japanese merchants and pirates appear to have been the first to establish small immigrant villages. For centuries they were sailing past Formosa to the China ports, to Southeast Asia and the Indies. In times of storm or when in need of supply or ship's repair they took shelter in the lagoons and inlets along Formosa's western shore. At last a considerable Japanese settlement (which they named Takasago) came into being at a point not far distant from present-day Tainan.

Then came the Spanish and the Dutch. When Japan's great dictator Hideyoshi menaced Luzon, late in the 1500's, Spain's Viceroy at Manila proposed to occupy Formosa. In 1626 Spanish forts and missions were established at Keelung and Tamsui on the island's northern tip. Meanwhile the Dutch had reached the Pescadores, seeking a naval base from which to harass Portuguese trade at Macao and to interfere with the Spanish shipping near the Philippines. In 1623 they abandoned Makung and moved to Formosa proper, founding Anping and the present-day city of Tainan. They sometimes quarreled with the Japanese nearby, but Takasago village faded rapidly after the home government adopted its Seclusion policies forbidding Japanese to travel overseas. In 1642 the Dutch Protestants

drove the Spanish Catholics from their narrow foothold at the north, and for twenty years thereafter held the island without serious challenge.

This might well be called Formosa's "European half-century," for the colony prospered as the Dutch created Formosa's first government, established schools and missions for the aborigines, opened up the countryside for agriculture and sent missionaries far back into the mountains. Thus in the second quarter of the 17th century European arms and administration opened the way for Chinese immigration. At that time Ming China was torn by civil rebellion and pressed hard by enemies from beyond the Great Wall. Everywhere local warlords and imperial agents extorted unreasonable taxes and tribute from the common people in an effort to support a tottering central government. Ignoring strict official edicts banning emigration, villagers, farmers and fishermen began to leave the country. The government considered them traitors, renegades and outlaws. Thousands went overseas to Java and Malaya, Borneo, Siam and the Philippines. Tens of thousands made their way across the water barrier to Formosa, so conveniently near - too near, as they were soon to learn.

These "outlaws" were the ancestors of the majority of people living on Formosa today. They were hardy pioneers, bold and adventurous. Those who sought new land beyond the limits of Dutch administration were on a true frontier; their contemporaries in faraway America provide a close parallel if one is needed to illustrate the situation. Going into their new fields they had to carry weapons as well as farm-tools, and they dwelt within stockades. The aborigines contested every advance into the hills, and the Chinese newcomers, on their part, considered the savages to be subhuman, or "non-people" who should be driven back into the highest mountains if they could not be exterminated in the foothills.

Soon enough within the borders of Dutch settlement both the aborigines and the immigrants grew restive, for the Europeans

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proved to be hard masters who demanded licenses for hunting and fishing and imposed heavy taxes on trade and produce. When at last a merchant-adventurer named Cheng Cheng-kung boldly assembled a fleet in the Pescadores and moved against the Dutch the Chinese immigrant settlers were ready to help him.

Cheng (known in Europe as Koxinga) was the son of a Japanese mother by a Chinese father who called himself and his family "Ming patriots," but when he had driven the Dutch from the island (in 1662) he set himself up in the European forts and mansions as "King of Tung-tu." From this island base he proposed to conquer the mainland, vowing to liberate the Chinese people from Manchu rule. The story here takes on a familiar note, for foreign (British) merchant-adventurers opened an agency through which they proposed to supply these "Ming patriots" with arms in return for substantial commercial concessions once the mainland liberation had been accomplished. This was the first military aid mission on Formosa but not the last.

After twenty years of independence, however, the island kingdom was threatened by an overwhelming mainland Chinese force, assembled in the Pescadores. A truce was negotiated by the men who controlled the little government at Tainan, and a deal was made with Peking. In reward for a peaceful surrender Koxinga's young grandson the third King of Tung-tu was granted a safe-conduct to Peking, given a resounding title and a pension, and retired to an easy life.

Peking sent a garrison force, magistrates, and a swarm of civil officers into the island. Two centuries of ineffective and abusive rule thereafter generated a local Formosan tradition of resentment and underlying hostility toward representatives of mainland authority. Riots and abortive independence movements took place so often that it became common in China to say of Formosa, "Every three years an uprising; every five years a rebellion." There were more than thirty violent outbursts in the 19th century.

## A FRONTIER TRADITION 5

Inland, at a distance from the walled garrison towns, there was chronic disorder. The outlying frontier villages, often at war with one another, were governed by family patriarchs and clan councils who were a law unto themselves within their own territories.

Such were conditions on Formosa when the Western world returned seeking trade in Asian waters after 1800. All nations with shipping in adjacent seas became deeply concerned. The island was considered to be one of the most dangerous and unhealthy spots in the Orient. The coasts were unlighted and unpatrolled; mariners shipwrecked on the eastern shores were at the mercy of headhunters and on the west they were victimized by so-called "wreckers" who plundered stranded vessels and gave no quarter to castaways. It was known that the local Chinese authorities frequently collaborated in these activities.

As international maritime traffic increased the number of shipwrecks and violent incidents multiplied until the situation became intolerable. But when foreign governments demanded corrective action Peking smoothly evaded responsibility. England and the United States in turn attempted to force the issue. In 1853-1854 Commodore Perry wanted to annex Formosa, but knowing that Washington would not approve, suggested a joint Sino-American economic and administrative program, indicating that he thought a well-established American community would in due course petition for union with the United States as the Americans in Hawaii were then proposing to do. He envisioned Formosa as an American outpost guaranteeing peace and order along the Western Pacific rim. England sent in gunboats and became embroiled in a local "Camphor War" in 1868. In 1874 Japan sent an expeditionary force into South Formosa which compelled Peking to admit responsibility and to pay a large indemnity for damages. In 1884 France occupied the Pescadores and Keelung and blockaded Formosa for a year during the Franco-Chinese war in Annam.

At last in 1887 the Chinese Government raised Formosa from the status of a Fukien dependency to the rank of a province

## Introduction 6

although nearly two-thirds of the island still lay beyond the frontiers of local Chinese control.

The changed status and a reform program came too late. In a distant quarrel concerning Korea, Japan defeated China in 1895. As part of the settlement Formosa and the Pescadores were ceded to Japan "in perpetuity." A touch of irony enters here, for China had hired an American lawyer named John Foster, a former Secretary of State, to guide Peking's representatives through the humiliating treaty conference. To lend moral support to his employers, Colonel Foster then proceeded to Keelung to assist in the formal territorial transfer. This was one more adventurous tale he had to tell to his little grandson, John Foster Dulles, then eight years old.

Japanese rule thereafter ensured a prompt suppression of piracy in Formosan waters, produced an efficient coastguard and well-lighted coasts. Soon the island ports were in good order and trade began to flourish. Formosa ceased to be an irritating international problem when it entered upon its "Japanese half century"; no foreign power challenged Japan's sovereign position in Formosa until the days of the Cairo meeting beside the Nile in 1943. Beyond regularizing a modest trade in tea and camphor and developing a modest market for American products, the United States showed little further interest.

# I

## The Cairo Declaration

*Filling the Empty Files at Washington, 1942*

As FAR As FORMOSA was concerned, Washington was sound asleep on December 6, 1941.

The rain of bombs on Luzon and the rattle of gunfire about Manila brought a rude awakening. Waves of Japanese bombers and fighters flew down from Formosan airfields, striking here and there along the way. Baguio was bombed at 9:30 A.M. All but two American planes were caught on the ground at Clark Field and destroyed at 12:45 P.M. On the next day the great Cavite Naval Base was put out of action. The Grand Marshal of the Philippines Armed Forces, General Douglas MacArthur, had lost his principal shield.

The Japanese military leaders had often called Formosa a "stepping stone to the south" or a "stationary aircraft carrier," and after fifty years of development, it was at last fulfilling its role. General MacArthur on his part, had one radar station at Aparri on the northern tip of Luzon, facing Formosa, and on that fatal day it was not working [1].

At Washington our Far Eastern military intelligence files concerning Formosa matched the "temporary" buildings in which they were housed, and like them were leftovers from World War I. This was also true of the white-haired Civil Service secretary who had been custodian of the files since 1918.

## 10 THE VIEW FROM WASHINGTON, 1941-1945

She had cared for her secrets tenderly, but the files concerning Formosa had not prospered. The "Taiwan Folders" in fact had scarcely been disturbed since the island was ceded to Japan in 1895.

There was a map of Keelung harbor, sent over from the Navy files, dated 1894, and a few photographs of Keelung taken before 1914. We had the standard hydrographic charts available to all navigators and a set of Japanese Imperial Land Survey maps which could be bought at any large stationers in Tokyo. We had a set of topographic maps prepared by the Imperial Japanese Army. The most interesting item in the Army's "Formosa File" was a report on Japan's alleged plan to use Formosa as a base for a push southward into Indochina. This was based on a newspaper series, in French, which had been published at Paris in 1905 [2].

With the strike at Pearl Harbor all this changed. At the Munitions Building in Washington the potted plants went out the door to make room for new files, pending transfer to the Pentagon. The Japan-Manchuria Branch of the Military Intelligence Services (G-2) established subsidiary "area desks" for Korea and Formosa. Area specialists were brought in, and from around the world to these desks came reports having anything to do with the Japanese Empire and its possessions.

The "shooting war" which involved men, ships, planes and guns had to be supported by economic, psychologic and diplomatic warfare requiring an immense range of intelligence data. A bewildering number of "alphabet agencies" sprang into being, each contributing raw data and research papers needed by the established intelligence divisions of the Army, Navy and State Departments.

Our most detailed current information came from British intelligence sources, and from Canadian and British missionaries - doctors, nurses, teachers and preachers - who had served many years in Formosa, knew the local languages and dialects, and had traveled extensively throughout the island. Members